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We address the question of existence of private quantum channel for qubits encoded in polarization
degrees of freedom of a photon, that remains secure even if multi-photon (instead of single-photon)
pulse is emitted. We show that random unitary channel distributed according to SU(2) Haar measure
has this property. Further we analyze the qubit unitary k-designs. We show they ensure security
if the photons’ parity of the source is guaranteed. Otherwise, the qubit unitary k-designs do not
guarantee perfect security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Symmetric encryption of messages is a fundamental
and well studied problem in classical cryptography. The
goal is to encode message (plaintext) into a ciphertext
in such a way that legitimate parties (usually called Al-
ice and Bob) can perfectly recover the original message,
while their adversary (traditionally called Eve) gains no
(additional) knowledge about the plaintext from the ci-
phertext.
In order to implement encryption, Alice and Bob must
have some advantage when compared to Eve. It is im-
possible to achieve secure encryption in a perfectly sym-
metric situation. The standard advantage Alice and Bob
have is a shared secret bit string (“key”), see Figure 1.
One-time pad (also known as Vernam cipher) is an en-
cryption system that achieves information-theoretical se-
curity, namely the security is not based on any computa-
tional assumptions. The encryption and decryption oper-
ation are the same, bitwise application of XOR (control-
not) operation controlled by the key, and applied to plain-
text or ciphertext, respectively. The key is a uniformly
random bit string, shared between Alice and Bob, and
unknown to Eve. Each bit of the key can be used only
once, i.e. to encrypt only single bit of plaintext. This is
where the name one-time pad comes from. In fact, this
property is necessary for any information-theoretically
secure encryption scheme [1].
The quantum generalization of one-time pad give raise
to various quantum communication primitives depending
on which part is “quantized” (plaintext, or ciphertext, or
or the shared key). Quantum teleportation [2] and su-
perdense coding [3] protocols are the most prominent ex-
amples. In particular, the teleportation is understood as
secure transfer of quantum plaintext by transfering classi-
cal ciphertext and exploiting quantum key. Accordingly,
the goal of superdense coding is to employ quantum key
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FIG. 1. Symmetric encryption.
to securely transfer classical plaintext by means of quan-
tum ciphertext.
In this paper we address the question of secure transfer
of quantum plaintext by communicating quantum cipher-
text encrypted by classical key. This situation was stud-
ied under the name private quantum channel [4], resp.
quantum one-time pad [6].
For private quantum channels the security is guaran-
teed by a shared classical secret key. It was shown in [4, 6]
that two bits of a secret key are necessary and sufficient to
encrypt one qubit, i.e. one two level quantum system. In
particular, based on the shared value of two bits (i.e. val-
ues 0, 1, 2, 3), Alice and Bob apply the encryption and de-
cryption operations by implementing the corresponding
Pauli unitary gates σ0 = I, σ1 = σx, σ2 = σy, σ3 = σz.
Alice applies this unitary onto a qubit (quantum plain-
text), which should be encrypted. This yields a quantum
ciphertext, which is transmitted via a quantum channel
to Bob. The decoding is simply done by inverting the
unitary that was applied by Alice, which is possible due
to existence of the pre-shared secret key. The full secu-
rity of the quantum one time pad protocol is guaranteed
if the secret key is uniformly random, the key is used
only once and if the implemented operations are really
unitary, thus, the following identity holds
% 7→ E(%) = 1
4
(%+ σx%σx + σy%σy + σz%σz) =
1
2
I .
This means that from the point of view of an eavesdrop-
per any qubit of a plaintext is mapped into a completely
mixed state ρ(0) ≡ 12I.
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2Assuming the dimension of the plaintext equals dimen-
sion of the ciphertext, the only invertible operations are
unitaries. In order to encrypt the plaintext, we choose
randomly (according to the key) a unitary operation, en-
crypt the plaintext, transmit it, and decrypt it by the
inverse operation. The essence of security is that without
knowledge of the key, the ciphertext carries no informa-
tion about the plaintext (for details see definition in [4]
and Appendix C), i.e. the average state ρ(0) transmitted
is independent of the plaintext ρ:
∃ρ(0) s.t. ∀ρ
∑
i
piUiρU
†
i = ρ
(0). (1)
It is known that ρ(0) = 12I for any reasonable set of plain-
texts, namely if 12I is in the convex span of plaintexts [9].
This gives us that the average encryption channel is
the full Haar-random unitary channel sending all states
to the completely mixed state. However, we need a finite
(as small as possible) set of unitaries, so this encryption
scheme is equivalent to unitary 1-design [13], i.e.∑
j
qjUj%U
†
j =
∫
SU(2)
dUU%U† ,
where dU is the (group invariant) Haar measure over
unitary channels. Let us stress that for encryption
of N qubits the length of the key reads l(~q) =
−N∑j qj log2 qj . It achieves its minimal value if and
only if unitary channels Uj are orthogonal (tr[U
†
jUk] = 0
for j 6= k) and qj = 1/4 for j = 1, 2, 3, 4, i.e. optimal
private quantum channel consists of four (uniformly dis-
tributed) encryption/decryption operations.
The basic framework of private quantum channel can
be generalized in various different ways. The encryption
of restricted sets of plaintexts was investigated in [8, 9],
the non-malleable encryption was addressed in [10] and
the encryption protocols for quantum continuous vari-
ables were designed and reported in [11, 12].
In practice, when we try to implement quantum one
time pad, some of the requirements may be hard to meet,
hence, the security of the ideal case is challenged. For
example, transmission of light seems to be nowadays the
best option for sending information between distant par-
ties. If qubits are encoded into single photons then uni-
tary transformations can be performed quite reliably, but
the preparation and the measurement of single photon
are often inefficient and noisy. Our goal in this paper
is to study and partially resolve security issues that may
arise from quantum state preparation. More precisely, we
consider the situation, when qubits are stored in the po-
larization of light and multiple photons (instead of only
one) are generated at the plaintext source. As we shall
see this effect needs to be taken into account when eval-
uating the security of the private quantum channel im-
plementation.
The situation we are addressing in our paper is that
when the experiment is set up to apply a unitary 1-design
to a single photon state, and instead multi-photon state is
generated, the resulting operation performed on the mul-
tiphoton state does not fulfill the definition (1). Namely,
the average output state is not independent of the input,
what makes the whole setup insecure. This is analogous
to the QKD scenario, when QKD protocol is secure for
single photon pulses, but becomes insecure as soon as
multi-photon pulse is emitted.
The paper is organized as follows: in the following Sec-
tion II we will introduce the formalism for quantum states
of light, in Section III we show that Haar distributed uni-
taries form a valid private quantum channel that remains
secure even for multi-photon pulses. Section IV analyzes
the security of unitary k-designs for the private encryp-
tion given the maximal number of photons of the multi-
photon source is limited by the energy constraint to k.
In particular, we show that unitary k-design based pri-
vate quantum channels remain secure for multi-photon
pulses, provided certain restrictions are met. The con-
clusions and discussions of the results are presented in
Section V.
II. MULTIPHOTON PULSES OF POLARIZED
LIGHT
Since free electric (and magnetic) field oscillates in the
plane perpendicular to the direction of the propagating
light wave, it has two evolving components, which be-
have as two harmonic oscillators. If we denote the two
components as x and y according to the two directions
perpendicular to the propagation direction, say z, then
we may introduce creation and annihilation operators
a†x, a
†
y, ax, ay. In the free space or in the isotropic optical
fibers the two oscillators are independent and simulta-
neous eigenstates of the number operators nx = a
†
xax,
ny = a
†
yay exist [16]. Let us denote the related Hilbert
space by H and an arbitrary normalized state in it can
be expressed as
|Ψ〉 =
∞∑
m,n=0
cmn|m,n〉, (2)
where cmn ∈ C,
∑
m,n |cmn|2 = 1 and |m,n〉 is an eigen-
state of both nx and ny with eigenvalues m,n, respec-
tively. Single photon polarization states are states shar-
ing just a single excitation between the two oscillators
(also called modes). The state with no excitations is
called vacuum and we denote it as |∅〉 ≡ |0, 0〉. If the
directions x, y are referred to as horizontal, and vertical,
respectively, then an arbitrary single photon pure state
can be seen as a superposition of a horizontal |H〉 ≡ |1, 0〉
and a vertical |V 〉 ≡ |0, 1〉 state
|ψ〉 = α|H〉+ β|V 〉 = (αa†x + βa†y)|∅〉 (3)
3If n photons with the same polarization are generated,
then the state is described as
|Ψ〉 = 1√
n!
(αa†x + βa
†
y)
n|∅〉 =
n∑
k=0
αkβn−k
√(
n
k
)
|k, n− k〉
(4)
The manifold of n-photon states belongs to the n + 1
dimensional subspace Hn spanned by vectors {|k, n −
k〉}nk=0.
Consider now system of n qubits, each prepared in a
state |ϕ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉. Then the overall state can be
written as
|ϕ〉⊗n = (α|0〉+ β|1〉)⊗n =
n∑
k=0
αkβn−k
√(
n
k
)
|sk〉, (5)
where |sk〉 are the totally symmetric states of n qubits
with k zeros (and n− k ones). This suggests us a simple
bijective isometry between n-photon subspace and the
totally symmetric subspace of n qubits, which is defined
by mapping states |k, n − k〉 onto |sk〉 ∀k or vice versa.
Let us define K+n as the totally symmetric subspace of n
qubits and K+0 as some one dimensional Hilbert space.
The above isometry describes an isomorphism between
Hn and K+n . Consequently, we obtain an isomorphism κ
between H and
K ≡ ⊕∞n=0K+n , (6)
since H = ⊕∞n=0Hn.
Thus, a polarization of an electro-magnetic wave of a
fixed frequency in a single spatial mode or in an optical
fiber can be equivalently described in Hilbert space K,
which is roughly speaking a direct sum of totally sym-
metric subspaces of different number of qubits. For no-
tational convenience we follow the following conventions.
We express pure states |Φ〉 from K as
|Φ〉 =
∞∑
n=0
cn|ϕn〉, (7)
where cn ∈ C,
∑
n |cn|2 = 1, |ϕn〉 ∈ K+n and we note that〈ϕn|ϕm〉 = δnm by definition of the inner product on the
direct sum Hilbert space.
For any polarization state |ψ〉 from Eq. (3) the n-
photon state with same polarization (given by Eq.(4)) is
mapped by κ into |ϕ〉⊗n ∈ K+n ⊂ K (see Eq. (5)). It is
easy to see that any linear optical transformation of the
two polarization modes
U ↔
(
b+x
b+y
)
=
(
Uxx Uxy
Uyx Uyy
)(
a+x
a+y
)
, (8)
which induces a unitary transformation U of the sin-
gle photon polarization U |ψ〉 = |ψ′〉, corresponds in iso-
morphism κ to a transformation U⊗n|ϕ〉⊗n = |ϕ′〉⊗n in
K+n , when applied to n photons of the same polariza-
tion. Thus, any change of polarization U , induced typ-
ically by quarter (QWP) and half wave plates (HWP),
is represented in our isomorphism κ by action of uni-
tary operator Ln(U) ≡ U⊗n in subspace K+n for every
n. This corresponds to an overall unitary transformation
L(U) = ⊕∞n=0Ln(U) = I ⊕ L1(U) ⊕ L2(U) ⊕ . . . acting
in K. The mapping U ∈ U(2) 7→ Ln(U) ∈ L(K+n ) is an
irreducible representation of the unitary group U(2) of
the order n/2, which is often referred to as a spin n/2 in
physics. In effect, the invertible encryption operation U
induced by QWPs and HWPs results for the multi pho-
ton pulse in the action of the direct sum representation
L(U) in Hilbert space K.
III. HAAR DISTRIBUTED UNITARIES AND
MULTIPHOTON SOURCE
Recall that the source is not ideal and prepares multi-
photon state
|Ψ〉 =
∞∑
n=0
cn
1√
n!
(αa†x + βa
†
y)
n|∅〉 .
As explained before, plaintext is encoded into the po-
larization (amplitudes α, β), and numbers ck do not con-
tain any information on the polarization.
In the isomorphism κ, which we will use for all further
descriptions, this state corresponds to a state in Eq. (7),
where |ϕn〉 = |ϕ〉⊗n. In this section, we will examine
how the encryption that samples unitaries with respect
to Haar measure on the unitary group U(2) works. Let
us for now ignore the fact that such scenario is imprac-
tical for encryption of quantum information, because it
assumes existence of (uncountably) infinite classical key
shared between Alice and Bob, however, the goal is to
show that such encryption constitutes a valid private
quantum channel also in the case of the considered multi-
photon source.
From the point of view of the eavesdropper the en-
cryption channel EHaar maps the overall density matrix
ρ = κ(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) into
ρ′ = EHaar(ρ) =
∫
U(2)
dUL(U)ρL(U)†
=
∫
U(2)
dU
∞∑
m,n=0
cmc
∗
nU
⊗m|ϕ⊗m〉〈ϕ⊗n|(U†)⊗n . (9)
By construction ρ′ commutes with any operator from the
representation L(U) and Schur’s lemma implies that ρ′ is
block diagonal in the irreducible subspaces. In our case
these are exactly subspaces K+n of K, thus,
ρ′ =
∞∑
n=0
tr[ρΠn]
1
n+ 1
Πn =
∞∑
n=0
|cn|2 1
n+ 1
Πn , (10)
where Πn are the projections onto subspaces K+n . Al-
though, the state ρ′ carries some information about the
imperfections of the source, contained in the coefficients
4cn, it does not posses any information about the polar-
ization degrees of freedom. Consequently, the encryption
is secure (in accordance with [4]), thus the Haar measure
defines a valid quantum private channel.
In practice, the energy of a source is limited, so it is
reasonable to put some upper bound N on the number of
photons that the source might generate. In such setting
it is reasonable to require that the encryption channel
acts in the same way as channel EHaar on the subspace
K(N) ≡ ⊕Nn=0K+n corresponding to at most N photons.
Since the channel EHaar does not mix subspaces K+n its
restriction EN,Haar to operators on K(N) is well defined.
Due to Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism [17] a channel
EN,Haar : L(K(N))→ L(K(N)) can be represented as an
operator HN
HN = EN,Haar ⊗ I(|ω〉〈ω|), (11)
where |ω〉 = ∑dimK(N)i=1 |i〉⊗ |i〉 ∈ K(N)⊗K(N) is an un-
normalized maximally entangled state. Without loss of
generality we will assume that the basis {|i〉}dimK(N)i=1 re-
spects the subspaces K+n . In particular, it is a union of or-
thonormal bases {|enk 〉}nk=0 (for n = 0, . . . , N) associated
with subspaces K+n . Define |ωn〉 =
∑n
k=0 |enk 〉 ⊗ |enk 〉 ∈K(N)⊗K(N). Then
|ω〉 =
N∑
n=0
|ωn〉 . (12)
Using Eqs. (10), (11) we obtain
HN =
N∑
m,n,k=0
1
k + 1
Πk ⊗ tr1[|ωm〉〈ωn|(Πk ⊗ I)] (13)
=
N∑
n=0
1
n+ 1
Πn ⊗Πn , (14)
where tr1 denotes the partial trace over the first part of
the tensor product and we used Πk ⊗ I|ωl〉 = δkl|ωl〉 and
tr1[|ωn〉〈ωn|] = Πn. In other words, ∀m,n = 0, . . . , N
EN,Haar ⊗ I(|ωm〉〈ωn|) = δmn
n+ 1
Πn ⊗Πn . (15)
In conclusion, in this section we have shown that i)
unitary changes of polarisation chosen randomly accord-
ing to Haar measure form a private quantum channel
in multi-photon settings ii) suitable encryption channel
should have the same Choi operator as EN,Haar if at most
N photons are expected to be simultaneously generated
by the source.
IV. UNITARY K-DESIGNS AND
MULTIPHOTON SOURCES
We have shown that Haar measure sampling of po-
larization transformations enable us to design a private
quantum channel for multiphoton sources. However,
such encryption is very “impractical”, because it as-
sumes existence of continous key between the sender and
the receiver. In this section we will address the ques-
tion whether k-designs can be used to implement private
quantum channels for multiphoton sources. This ques-
tion is motivatied by the following observation.
It is known that channels generated by k-fold tensor
products of Haar distributed unitary channels (U⊗k) are
not mapping the state space of k-partite system into a
single point, thus, the related k-designs are not sufficient
to encrypt arbitrary k-partite state. However, when re-
stricted to completely symmetric states k-designs define a
valid private quantum channel. The indistinguishability
of photons allows us to represent the multiphoton states
by completely symmetric states, thus, k-designs might be
relevant for their encryption.
It is the goal of a unitary k-design (for review see [14])
to mimic the average effect of Haar distributed unitary
channels. In particular, a set {Uj}Mj=1 is a qubit unitary
k–design Fk if for all states ξ of k qubits (associated with
a Hilbert space Qk)
Fk(ξ) ≡ 1|M |
M∑
j=1
U⊗kj ξU
†⊗k
j =
∫
U
U⊗kξU†⊗kdU . (16)
Let us stress that any k-design is also (k− 1)–design, i.e.
Fk−1(ξ) ≡ 1|M |
M∑
j=1
U
⊗(k−1)
j ξU
†⊗(k−1)
j
=
∫
U
U⊗(k−1)ξU†⊗(k−1)dU ,
for all ξ ∈ L(Qk−1).
For the multiphoton case we are asking whether sam-
pling of the qubit unitary k-designs resembles the sam-
pling over the whole Haar measure when the energy of
the multiphoton source is restricted, i.e. we want to see
whether (Eq.(9)) for all % ∈ S(K)(k)∑
j
qjL(Uj)%L(Uj)
† = Ek,Haar(%) (17)
for some k-design {qj , Uj}.
In what follows we will analyze the channel Fk induced
by qubit unitary k–design in a basis that is induced in
Qk by representation U 7→ U⊗k of group SU(2). Let
us denote by Ms the 2s + 1-dimensional Hilbert space
of spin s irreducible representation of SU(2), where s =
0, 12 , 1,
3
2 , 2,
5
2 , . . . . Set either s0 = 0, or s0 = 1/2 if k is
even, or odd, respectively. The whole Hilbert space Qk
can be decomposed as
Qk =
k/2⊕
s=s0
Ms ⊗ Cms , (18)
5where Cms is the multiplicity space of the dimension
ms =
2s+1
k/2+s+1
(
k
k/2+s
)
(see [15]). In such basis k-fold ten-
sor product of an arbitrary qubit operator U is expressed
as
U⊗k =
k/2⊕
s=s0
Us ⊗ Ims . (19)
where Us ∈ L(Ms) and Ims denotes the unit operator
on Cms . Especially, for U = Uj we will use the notation
U⊗kj =
⊕k/2
s=s0
U
(j)
s ⊗ Ims . We see that both k–design
and the Haar distributed unitaries act trivially in the
multiplicity spaces Cms .
Thanks to this fact there exist infinitely many sub-
spaces W of Qk, which are isomorphic to
⊕k/2
s=s0
K+2s
and where the representation of the group U(2) acts
in the same way. More precisely, we choose a one di-
mensional subspace pis in every space Cms , thus we have
W = ⊕k/2s=s0Ms ⊗ pis. This naturally provides the de-
scribed isomorphism if basis of the irreducible subspaces
Ms and K+2s are suitably paired, i.e. |esj〉 ∈ K+2s cor-
responds to |fsj 〉 ∈ Ms for suitably chosen orthonor-
mal basis {|fsj 〉}2s+1j=1 . In order to keep the notation
simple we will not distinguish Ms ⊗ pis and Ms, be-
cause they are isomorphic. It follows from Eq. (19) that
U⊗k acts in W as a unitary transformation ⊕k/2s=s0 Us.
Since k-design Fk is a mixture of unitary channels U⊗kj
we can conclude that it induces a quantum channel
Fk,W( ξ ) =
∑
j pj(
⊕k/2
s=s0
U
(j)
s ) ξ (
⊕k/2
s′=s0 U
(j)†
s′ ) acting
on the subspace W ⊂ Qk.
Using the above mentioned isomorphism between K+2r
and Mr it follows that (see Eq.(12))
|ωr〉 =
2r+1∑
j=1
|frj 〉 ⊗ |frj 〉 (20)
is the unnormalized maximally entangled state onMr ⊗
Mr, thus, |Ω〉 =
⊕k/2
r=s0
|ωr〉 =
∑k/2
r=s0
|ωr〉 is the un-
normalized maximally entangled state on W ⊗W. Con-
sequently, the corresponding Choi-Jamiolkowski state of
Fk,W reads
Fk,W = (Fk,W ⊗ I)|Ω〉〈Ω| = (Fk,W ⊗ I)
 k/2∑
r,t=s0
|ωr〉〈ωt|

=
∫
U(2)
dU
∑
s
(Us ⊗ I2s+1)|ωs〉〈ωs|(Us ⊗ I2s+1)†
=
k/2∑
s=s0
1
2s+ 1
I2s+1 ⊗ I2s+1 , (21)
where we using the same Schur’s lemma argument as in
section III conclude that the Haar averaging erases the
parts of the input state, which map between subspaces of
different irreducible representations (irrep) while for the
FIG. 2. The table schematically illustrates for which blocks
(depicted in gray) the Choi-Jamiolkowski operators of EN,Haar
and Fk,W coincide in case of a qubit 5–design.
same irreps it creates a multiple of the completely mixed
state 12s+1I2s+1 ∈ L(Ms).
It is useful to define subspaces Keven(n) =
⊕n/2
s=0K+2s
and Kodd(n) =
⊕(n−1)/2
s=0 K+2s+1, because the subspaceW is either isomorphic to the subspace Keven(k) (even
number of photons) or to Kodd(k) (odd number of pho-
tons). Suppose W = Keven(k) (meaning that k is even
and s0 = 0). Then clearly Fk,W = Hk on the sub-
space W ' ⊕k/2s=0K+2s ≡ Keven(k) ⊂ K(k). Moreover,
for (k − 1)–design (induced by the considered k–design)
we find (following all the previous steps) that Fk−1 = Hk
on Kodd(k − 1) ⊂ K(k).
In conclusion, if elements of qubit k–design (whether
k is even, or odd) determine polarization rotations of
multi-photon source (generating at most k photons) this
constitutes a private quantum channel for subspaces of
odd and even number of photons (see Fig. (2). In partic-
ular, we have shown that for all qubit states |ϕ〉, |ψ〉 the
following identity holds
Fk(|ϕ⊗m〉〈ψ⊗n|) = 1|M |
M∑
j=1
U⊗mj |ϕ⊗m〉〈ψ⊗n|U†⊗nj = 0 ,
(22)
if m and n have the same parity (both even, or both odd).
However, for states of undefined parity it is not clear if
k–design would erase coherences between odd and even
photon number subspaces of K(k). In what follows we
will show that this is not the case.
Consider the 12-element Clifford 3-design EClifford [19].
Direct calculation shows (see Appendix A) that off-
diagonal block of its Choi-Jamiolkowski state (EClifford⊗
I)|ω2〉〈ω1| is nonzero, thus the state (EClifford(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)
still depends on the polarisation parameters α and β. In
conclusion, k-designs do not necessarily constitute pri-
vate quantum channels.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have shown that Haar sampled uni-
taries constitute private quantum channel that remains
6secure even when photon source generates more copies
of identically prepared polarized photons (multi-photon
source). However, unlike in the case of the single-photon
sources encryption, a general k–design does not have this
property.
Let us now discuss conditions on a multi-photon source
under which its secure encryption by polarization rota-
tions forming a N–design is possible. Clearly this hap-
pens when a source is “parity stable”, i.e. it is produc-
ing states with nonzero amplitudes in only even (or only
odd) photon number subspaces. An example could be a
Type I spontaneous parametric down conversion source,
which produces only even photon number terms of the
same polarization. For a general multi-photon source we
may think of its combination with selective erasure chan-
nel eliminating coherences between subspaces of different
parity while keeping the other subspaces undisturbed.
An example is the non-destructive photon number mea-
surement. In practice, it can be realized by using sponta-
neous parametric down-conversion source, where in con-
trast to previous case we would use signal and idler pho-
tons separately. Measuring the number of photons (or
just parity) of the idler photon, the signal photon would
be collapsed to a state with zero coherences between dif-
ferent photon number subspaces.
One can also argue that if the encryption is restricted
to be realized by linear optics polarization changes (i.e.
by randomly choosing unitary transformations L(U))
then the only encryption channel secure without addi-
tional restrictions is given by EHaar. The idea is that no
matter with which polarization we start, the output state
must be the same. Since the operations L(U) can only
rotate the polarization the only possibility how the ran-
dom mixture of rotations gives always the same output
is when they always yield a state covariant with respect
to rotations. Since linear optical elements do not change
the photon number we get the uniqueness.
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Appendix A: Clifford 3-design
The goal of this section is to demonstrate existence
of a k-design, which if used to determine polarization
rotations of a multi-photon source does not create a pri-
vate quantum channel. Consider a channel EClifford(%) =
1
12
∑
j L(Uj)%L(Uj)
† generated by the 12-element Clif-
ford 3-design [18, 19]. The 3-design {Uj}12j=1 is formed
by identity, three Pauli operators (σ0 = I, σx, σy, σz) and
eight unitary operators
Uklm = exp[ı
2pi
3
~nklm · ~σ]
~nklm =
1√
3
(
(−1)k, (−1)l, (−1)m) and k, l,m = 0, 1. Vec-
tors ~nklm form vertices of a cube. The above men-
tioned 12 operators in arbitrary order will be further
addressed as Uj . Although above we described a 3-
design we will only use it as a qubit 2-design and 1-
design. If EClifford was a private quantum channel then
its Choi operator would be the same as for EN,Haar (see
Eq. (15)). In particular, EN,Haar(|ω2〉〈ω1|) = 0 and we
will show that EN,Clifford(|ω2〉〈ω1|) 6= 0, i.e. the block
of the Choi operator that describes transformation be-
tween 2 photon and 1 photon subspaces of the Fock
space (or equivalently using the isomorphism between
2/2 and 1/2 spin irreps) is non zero. For the output
space it is more practical to calculate in the space of two
qubits, where spin 2/2 irrep is naturally embedded in
the symmetric subspace Psym and elements of the design
Uj are represented by U
⊗2
j . Thus, we will use operator
T = |2, 0〉〈00|+ |1, 1〉 1√
2
(〈01|+ 〈10|) + |0, 2〉〈11| to trans-
port this three dimensional subspace of 2-qubits back into
three dimensional 2-photon subspace of the Fock space.
Similarly, a single qubit 2-dimensional Hilbert space is
transferred by operator S = |1, 0〉〈0| + |0, 1〉〈1|. Then,
evaluating the block
C 2
2
1
2
≡ (EClifford ⊗ I)|ω2〉〈ω1|
=
1
12
∑
j
(U
(j)
2/2 ⊗ I2/2)|ω2〉〈ω1|(U (j)†1/2 ⊗ I1/2)
=
1
12
∑
j
(T⊗T )(U⊗2j ⊗I)|ω+〉〈φ+|(U†j ⊗I)(S†⊗S†)
results in
C 2
2
1
2
=

a 0 0 −b
0 c 0 0
0 b −b∗ 0
0 0 c 0
b∗ −b∗ b b
0 c 0 0
0 b −b∗ 0
0 0 c 0
−b∗ 0 0 a∗

6= 0 (A1)
where a = 3+ı12 , b =
1+ı
12 , c =
1
3
√
2
and we used |φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+|11〉), |ω+〉 = |00〉⊗2 + 12 (|01〉+|10〉)⊗2 +|11〉⊗2.
As the input vector |ω+〉 belongs to Psym ⊗ Psym sub-
space it is clear that a four qubit unitary (16x16 ma-
trix) U⊗2j ⊗ I will leave |ω+〉 in that subspace and after
operator T ⊗ T we get something from a 9 = 3 × 3 di-
mensional subspace corresponding to tensor product of
7two 2-photon Fock subspaces. On the input the op-
erator C 2
2
1
2
is nonzero only for 4 = 2 × 2 dimensional
subspace formed by tensor product of two 1-photon sub-
spaces. Thus, in corresponding basis operator C 2
2
1
2
has
9×4 matrix, which is evidently nonzero and so we showed
that EClifford(|ω2〉〈ω1|) 6= 0. We conclude that EClifford
does not constitute a private quantum channel.
Appendix B: Fixed parity example
In this appendix we will discuss an explicit example
illustrating that for pure polarization states of a fixed
parity the encoding provided by Clifford design is secure,
thus, no information on the polarisation can be extracted
from the resulting ciphertext.
Suppose the multi-photon source has produced a state
(plaintext)
|ψ〉 = c|0, 0〉+
√
1− |c|2(αa†x + βa†y)2|0, 0〉
= c|0, 0〉+
√
1− |c|2(α2|2, 0〉+
√
2αβ|1, 1〉+ β2|0, 2〉
= c|ψ0〉+
√
1− |c|2|ψ2〉 (B1)
which is a superposition of vacuum and 2-photons in a
fixed polarization given by amplitudes α, β. After the
encryption by EClifford we obtain:
EClifford(|ψ〉〈ψ|) =|c|2|0, 0〉〈0, 0|
+ c
√
1− |c|2EClifford(|ψ0〉〈ψ2|)
+ c∗
√
1− |c|2EClifford(|ψ2〉〈ψ0|)
+ (1− |c|2)EClifford(|ψ2〉〈ψ2|),
where we used that the vacuum state is unaffected by
polarization rotations. For the second and third term we
need to calculate
1
12
12∑
j=1
U
(j)
2/2|ψ2〉 = T (
1
12
12∑
j=1
U⊗2j )|ϕ2〉
= 0, (B2)
where |ϕ2〉 = α2|00〉 + αβ(|01〉 + |10〉) + β2|11〉 and T
is defined Appendix A. By direct evaluation of the sum
we find that it equals to the projector onto 2-qubit anti-
symmetric subspace and this nulifies the symmetric state
|ϕ2〉 on the right. We evaluate the last term in similar
fashion.
EClifford(|ψ2〉〈ψ2|) = 1
12
12∑
j=1
U
(j)
2/2|ψ2〉〈ψ2|(U (j)2/2)†
= T
1
12
1∑
j=1
2U⊗2j |ϕ2〉〈ϕ2|(U⊗2j )† T †
=
1
3
Π2, (B3)
We used that qubit 2-design is mapping symmetric pure
states to a third of a projector onto the symmetric sub-
space, which is by T mapped into projector onto 2-photon
subspace of the Fock space. Putting all together we ob-
tained:
EClifford(|ψ〉〈ψ|) =|c|2|0, 0〉〈0, 0|
+ (1− |c|2)1
3
Π2,
As expected we see that information on polarization am-
plitudes is completely erased, only the imperfections of
the source represented here by coefficient c remain.
Appendix C: Note on security definition of private
quantum channels
Unconditionally secure (in fact information-
theoretically secure) classical encryption was formally
introduced in the seminal paper by Claude Shannon in
[1], where he also shows that one-time pad encryption
system fulfills this definition.
In the traditional terminology of cryptography, the
sender chooses a message (called plaintext) she wants to
send. The set of all possible plaintexts (e.g. the set of all
bit strings of length 64) is publicly known and is a part
of the specification of an encryption system. In order to
transfer the message securely, sender and receiver must
have some advantage over the eavesdropper, usually in
the form of a pre-shared secret bit string called key. The
set of all possible keys (once again e.g. the set of all bit
strings of length 64) is public and is a part of the spec-
ification of the encryption system. Sender and receiver
choose the key randomly from this set, according to a
public and pre-agreed probability distribution (most of
the time uniform).
Sender then transforms the plaintext, using an encryp-
tion function, into a ciphertext. Encryption function is
publicly known binary function, taking plaintext and key
as inputs. The encryption function is public and part of
the specification of the encryption system. Ciphertext is
then transmitted via an insecure channel to the receiver,
with the expectation that it will be observed by an eaves-
dropper. When the receiver obtains the message, he will
use a decryption function and key to obtain the plain-
text. Once again, decryption function is public and is a
part of the specification of the encryption system.
The definition of secrecy, when stated informally, re-
quires that observing the ciphertext gives no extra in-
formation about the plaintext to the eavesdropper. By
“extra information” we mean that the eavesdropper may
have some a priori information regarding plaintext, e.g.
that it is a meaningful text in English language encoded
into a bit string using ASCII character encoding.
Let us denote the set of all plaintexts by P , set of all
keys by K together with some probability distribution on
K giving a rise to the random variable K, and a set of all
8ciphertexts by C. Plaintexts and ciphertexts are mutu-
ally bound via the encryption and decryption function by
c = e(p, k) and p = d(c, k). These two functions together
with probability distribution onK give rise to conditional
distributions (random variables) prob(P = p|C = c) and
prob(C = c|P = p). Formally, the encryption systems is
the five–tuple (P,C,K, e, d). The standard form of the
perfect secrecy condition then reads
∃x s.t. ∀c ∈ C, ∀p ∈ P prob(P = p|C = c) = x
The crucial property for the secrecy is that regardless of
what ciphertext “c” is being transmitted, the probability
distribution prob(P = p|C = c) on plaintexts induced by
any ciphertext “c” is the same for all ciphertexts. Re-
gardless of what ciphertext the eavesdropper observes,
his estimate of the plaintext remains the same.
In order to understand the definition of Private quan-
tum channel, we use an equivalent statement
∃y s.t. ∀c ∈ C,∀p ∈ P prob(C = c|P = p) = y.
This can be further transformed to
∃q0 s.t. ∀p ∈ P prob(C = c|P = p) = q0(c),
with qo being a (conditional) probability distribution on
ciphertexts. This formulation accents the fact that the
conditional probability distribution prob(C = c|P = p)
describing probability distribution of C conditioned by a
particular p is fixed. It remains to note that in the defi-
nition of private quantum channel, the average state ρ(0)
is the equivalent of conditional probability distribution
q0 on the ciphertexts and the set of all states plays the
role of the set of plaintexts. This gives us exactly the
definition of the PQC:
∃ρ(0) s.t. ∀ρ
∑
i
piUiρU
†
i = ρ
(0),
where ρ is the ciphertext being transmitted, and∑
i piUiρU
†
i is our prediction of the ciphertext given the
particular plaintext ρ. The PQC definition says this pre-
diction is independent of the plaintext in accordance with
the classical definition of security. If this condition is not
satisfied, then there are at least two different plaintexts
giving rise to different average states that can be in prin-
ciple discriminated.
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